Management of heterogeneous enterprise security mechanisms is complex and requires a security administrator to have deep knowledge of each security mechanism's configuration. Effective configuration may be hampered by poor understanding and/or management of the enterprise security policy which, in turn, may unnecessarily expose the enterprise to known threats. This paper argues that knowledge about detailed security configuration, enterprise-level security requirements including best practice recommendations and their relationships can be modelled, queried and reasoned over within an ontology-based framework. A threatbased approach is taken to structure this knowledge. The management of XMPP application-level and firewall-level access control configuration is investigated.
INTRODUCTION
An enterprise security policy is a high-level policy document that defines a "set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system or organization provides security services to protect sensitive and critical system resources" [35] . An enterprise security policy provides highlevel requirements and is typically not intended to prescribe low-level security controls. In practice, enterprise-level security requirements are implemented as a series of heterogeneous inter-dependent security mechanism configurations Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. that span multiple subnets and system services. As a consequence, proper service operation is dependent on each control configuration. Application-level services are becoming more sophisticated and may provide their own security controls. For example, an XMPP-based Instant Messaging server may use a server white-list to limit connections to trusted domains. Securing this service goes beyond configuring the application-level mechanism: best practice [37] recommends that network access controls such as firewalls should also be used as part of security in depth strategy.
Access control configuration may be hampered by poor understanding and/or management of the enterprise security policy. For example, consider the following enterprise-level security requirements regarding an XMPP server: permit client-to-server (C2S) access to the XMPP server; permit clients to transfer files over XMPP on the internal network and permit server-to-server (S2S) access with trusted external XMPP servers. However, implementing access-control rules for XMPP clients and servers is not just about making ports 5222 (C2S) and 5269 (S2S) accessible on the XMPP server and/or intermediatory access controls such as firewalls. One may wish to only permit certain C2S communication (for example, by an IP address whitelist), require clients to use TLS encryption, accept only SASL [31] authentication from some S2S communication and dialback [24] authentication for others, prevent external file transfer and deal with XMPP traffic that is tunneled through proxies (for example, XMPP HTTP-bind). Furthermore, XMPP traffic does not necessarily have to communicate on the IANA [19] recommended XMPP ports. It may also be prudent to provide content sanitation at the application-layer. For example, controlling Spam over Instant Messaging (SPIM) by filtering known SPIM signatures within XMPP message stanzas.
Notwithstanding the challenge of providing an accurate enterprise security policy, one must also consider how each security mechanism may contribute to policy enforcement. For example, regardless of a firewall's capability to perform deep packet inspection, application-level content filtering may only be feasible using the XMPP server's access control when C2S and S2S communication is encrypted end-to-end; while connection-throttling is best implemented at the firewall. Thus, designing an access control configuration is complex and challenging, and is largely dependent on the expert knowledge of the security administrator drawing upon best practice and standards.
We argue that a framework is required in which one can uniformly represent and reason about the knowledge associated with a security configuration. We take an ontology-engineering approach to modelling this security configuration knowledge. Previous research [9, 10] focused on using ontologies to model firewall based access controls; in this paper we consider the modeling of and interplay between these firewall controls and the security controls provided by the application.
An ontology provides a conceptual model of a domain of interest [36] . It does so by providing a formal vocabulary describing various aspects of the domain of interest and provides a rich set of constructs to build a more meaningful level of knowledge. In the case of access control configuration management, an ontology provides the ability to make logical assertions and inferences with which to structure, share and infer new knowledge about the application-level access control and network access control domains.
A threat-based approach is proposed as a means of structuring the knowledge about the management of access control configuration. Semantic Threat Graphs [11] , a variation of the traditional threat tree, are encoded within the ontology-based framework in order to relate knowledge about enterprise-level security requirements, best practice recommendations and access-control rules in terms of assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Threats are organised into a hierarchical structure such as a Microsoft STRIDEbased [17] hierarchy. Identifying threats in this way, for example Denial of Service attacks, facilitates the generation of appropriate access-control rules (countermeasures) such as connection-throttling and/or automatic blacklisting of offending servers (IP addresses). The semantic threat graph approach takes advantage of an ontology's ability to share and integrate knowledge within other ontologies. Thus, the XMPP and iptables ontologies are reused to describe detailed countermeasure configurations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines an ontology for XMPP security configuration. A threat model for XMPP server hosting is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 describes how enterprise-level security requirements can be captured in terms of semantic threat graphs. A knowledgebase of best practice countermeasures against known threats are encoded as semantic threat graphs in Section 5. For example, XEP-0205 [30] and NIST-800-123 [34] recommend multiple countermeasures that mitigate the threat of Denial of Service when hosting an XMPP server. Section 6 provides some examples that demonstrate synthesis and analysis of these access control configurations.
XMPP SECURITY ONTOLOGY
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is a protocol that is used for instant messaging, voice and video calls, presence, and publish-subscribe services [29] . There are three scenarios whereby access control needs to be considered, namely client-to-server (C2S) communication, client-to-client (C2C) server-less communication and serverto-server (S2S) communication. Server-to-server communication is known as a 'federation' that exists between different enterprise XMPP servers, thus facilitating inter-domain client message routing and search of client contacts [32] .
An ontology for XMPP security configuration is developed. For reasons of space only a fragment of the ontology outlining the S2S access control is presented. Concepts represent sets of individuals (instances) and properties (roles) represent binary relations applied to individuals. Note that in presenting the XMPP model components, for reasons of space, complete specifications in particular, disjoint axioms, sub-properties, data type properties or closure axioms are omitted. The ontologies in this paper were developed using Description Logic [5] and SWRL [25] , an overview of which is provided in the appendix. Authentication and Encryption. Concept S2SAuthRule represents the set of authentication rules (individuals) that define one or more authentication methods supported by an XMPP server. Encryption (tlsEncrypted property) is also supported over the Transport Layer Security protocol [8] .
S2SAuthRule ⊑ XM P P AuthRule ⊓ ∃ ≥1 authenticateW ith.Authenication ⊓ ∃=1tlsEncrypted.Boolean
Concept Authentication defines the vocabulary for federated S2S authentication.
Server federation supports two kinds of authentication methods: Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) EX-TERNAL [31] and server dialback [24] . SASL EXTERNAL provides a basis for the initiating server to reuse the certificate presented during TLS negotiation for authentication. While, server dialback is the less secure authentication method, it is commonly used in practice [32] . For example, individual xmpprDialback represents a requirement for (unencrypted) 'server dialback' for S2S federation.
For the sake of clarity, meaningful identifiers are associated with individuals. For example, the individual xmpprDialback identifies an XMPP rule that permits the use of 'server dialback' as its authentication method. Access Control List. An access control list specifies the XMPP servers (IP Address or DN SN ame) which a server may f ederateW ith (property), where P ermission is an enumerated set of individuals allow and deny.
ACLRule ⊑XM P P Rule ⊓ ∃=1f ederateW ith.(IP Address ⊔ DN SN ame)⊓ ∃=1hasP ermission.P ermission For example, individual xmpprAllowUCC an instance of concept ACLRule, states that the XMPP server will allow federated requests from an XMPP server with the domain name www.ucc.ie (individual identifier ucc).
Denial of Service Mitigation. Concept DoSRule defines the maximum number of simultaneous S2S connections that may be permitted with a remote XMPP server.
Indiviudal xmpprLimitConn limits the number of simultaneous connections that can be established with any XMPP server (denoted by the wildcard IP address of ip*.*.*.*) to 1.
Application-Layer Content Filtering. Concept CF Rule defines the set of rules that filters XMPP message stanza payloads. Such filtering may be used to mitigate against the threat of known SPIM, Malware and URL Phishing.
CF Rule ⊑ XM P P Rule ⊓ ∃ ≥1 hasP attern.String ⊓ ∃=1hasP ermission.P ermission
For example, xmpprBadWord is used to deny XMPP message stanzas that contain the word "sex".
CF Rule(xmpprBadWord ) ← hasP attern(xmpprBadWord, "sex") ⊓ hasP ermission.(xmpprBadWord , deny)
THREAT MODEL FOR XMPP
A semantic threat graph [11] , constructed in terms of an ontology, can be defined as a graph that represents the meaning of a threat domain. Enterprise assets are represented as individuals of the Asset concept. An asset may have one or more hasWeakness's (property relationship) that relate to individuals categorised in the Vulnerability concept. Individuals of the Vulnerability concept are exploitable (exploitedBy) by a threat or set of threats (Threat concept). As a consequence, an asset that has a vulnerability is, therefore, also threatenedBy a corresponding Threat. A countermeasure mitigates particular vulnerabilities. Countermeasures are deemed to be kinds-of assets and thus are defined as a subConceptOf Asset. Figure 1 illustrates an example instantiation of a semantic threat graph that mitigates a Denial of Service attack against the XMPP server. Asset. Concept Asset represents any enterprise entity that may be the subject of a threat. While assets can include people and physical infrastructure, this paper only consid- ers computer-system based entities such as XMPP servers, firewalls and so forth. Individuals of concept Asset may have zero or more vulnerabilities (∀ restriction) along property hasW eakness. As a result, those assets may be exposed to various individuals of the T hreat concept. An asset may have the capability to implement a countermeasure to protect itself or other assets.
Concept Asset is further specialised to have more specific kinds of asset concepts. For example, the set of business servers and security servers (individuals) an enterprise may have may be represented as BusinessServer, SecServer ⊑ Server, where Server is a sub-concept of Asset. Figure 2 depicts a fragment of the Asset hierarchy. Note the doubleheaded arrow represents a subsumption relation. An individual xmppServ of the BusinessServer concept (inferred as an individual of concept Asset) is vulnerable to a connection-based Denial of Service (vulConnDos) weakness. As a consequence, the xmppServ isT hreatenedBy a connectionflood attack represented as threatConnFlood individual.
Concept N etSecServer represents the network access control systems that protect (protects) internal servers (including themselves). Individuals of concept N etSecServer implement one or more (∃ ≥1 ) individuals of the N ACRule concept (sub-concept of Countermeasure). Note, the protects property is inherited from its parent concept SecServer.
The following ontology fragment asserts that the gateway firewall (gwFW) protects the XMPP server from a Denial of Service attack by implementing a TCP connection-limit countermeasure (iptables rule iptrLimitConn ).
Threat. A threat is a potential for violation of security [35] . An individual of the T hreat concept is considered to exploit one or more vulnerabilities.
For example, individual threatConnFlood exploits the vulConnDoS vulnerability and threatens the xmppServ.
The Threat concept defines a number of sub-concepts in accordance with best practice, such as the Microsoft STRIDE standard [17] whereby threats are categorised as: Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege. Figure 3 depicts a fragment of the threat hierarchy. Vulnerability. A vulnerability is an asset flaw or security weakness that has the potential to be exploited by a threat.
The following ontology fragment states that the xmppServ is susceptible to a threatConnFlood attack via the vulConnDoS weakness. Note, vulConnDoS represents a weakness in the XMPP stack whereby it is possible to surpass the maximum number of XMPP-based socket connections permitted by the unprotected XMPP protocol [30] .
Countermeasure. A countermeasure is an action or process that mitigates vulnerabilities and prevents and/or reduces threats. A countermeasure is an asset.
Countermeasure ⊑ Asset
Concepts XM P P Rule and N ACRule are sub-concepts of concept Countermeasure. Concept XM P P Rule is representative of the XMPP access-control rules that mitigate one or more XMPP vulnerabilities.
The following ejabberd [1] XMPP rule: {access, max_s2s_connections, [1, all]} is represented as individual xmpprLimitConn presented in Section 2, where it is implemented by the xmppServ to mitigate the vulnerability vulConnDoS on the XMPP server itself.
Note, while sample low-level ejabberd configurations are used within this paper, the ontology for XMPP access control is implementation neutral and is equally applicable to other XMPP implementations such as Openfire [21] . Concept N ACRule represents network access control rules. Concept IP T Rule is a sub-concept of concept N ACRule and represents the set of iptables firewall rules.
Individual iptrLimitConn , mitigates the XMPP server vulnerability vulConnDoS and is implemented by the gwFW.
The following iptables rule: iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d xmppServIP --dport 5269 -m connlimit --connlimit-above 2 -j DROP limits the number of connections to the XMPP server to 1 and, based on [9, 10] , is represented as individual iptrLimitConn .
Assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures have additional properties and for the sake of clarity, a number of property relationships have been excluded from this discussion. For example, servers are assigned one or more IP addresses (depending on the number of network interfaces they may have). Access is provided based on the server's port, for example a XMPP server is accessible over port 5269. However, not all servers (or daemons) are accessible through a port number, for example, an iptables firewall server does not directly support network access. Each server has a particular role (operatesAs property), for example, the gwFW individual is identified as an iptables firewall via its string assignment 'iptables'. Threats originate from one or more IP addresses. Countermeasures are executable on a particular type of security server. For example, individual iptrLimitConn isExecutableOn the gwFW iptables firewall.
Asset ⊑ ∃ ≥1 hasIP Address.IP Address ⊓ ∀ ≥0 hasP ort.P ort ⊓ ∃=1operatesAs.String T hreat ⊑ ∃ ≥1 hasT hreatSource.IP Address Countermeasure ⊑ ∃=1isExecutableOn.SecServer
ENTERPRISE SECURITY POLICY
This section considers the relationship between the enterprise security policy and the lower-level security controls (iptables and XMPP) that implement the policy. Example 1. Consider the enterprise-level security requirement that states the following: 'The enterprise XMPP server asset is permitted to federate with other XMPP servers'. Table 1a depicts some of the threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures associated with upholding this policy.
Unavailability of service (threatNoListeningS2SPort )on the S2S port is considered to be a threat related to federation. Enabling the correct service port (IANA port 5269) by implementing countermeasure xmpprEnableS2SPort will ensure that the XMPP server is capable of federating with other XMPP servers. Table 1a outlines the identified threats, vulnerabilities and associated countermeasures. Countermeasures are also required to mitigate threats originating from an overlyrestrictive firewall: iptrAllowInS2SPort permits inbound access to the XMPP server over port 5269 and iptrAllowOutS2SPort permits the corresponding outbound traffic.
In order to uphold the enterprise-level security policy, each countermeasure must be implemented by its respective access control mechanism. Sample application-level and network access-control rules related to the ejabberd XMPP server and iptables firewall are outlined in Table 2 . Example 2 In this example, the enterprise-security requirement described in Example 1 is further restricted to prevent federation with untrusted XMPP servers. That is, 'Serverto-Server federation is not permitted except between trusted XMPP servers with an IP address of 143.239.75.235 and 193.1.193 .140 '. This enterprise-level security requirement is structured according to the threats identified in Table 1b. A threat of unintended access, threatUnintendedAccess , regarding S2S federation is identified. Disabling the S2S service port (xmpprDisableS2SPort ) is not applicable in this example. Rather, the recommended countermeasures are to enable the S2S service port (xmpprEnableS2SPort ) and implement a default deny access control policy (xmpprDefaultDenyS2SAccess ) where exceptions must be defined. As a consequence of countermeasure xmpprDefaultDenyS2SAccess , two additional vulnerabilities are introduced: VulNoS2S143.239.75.235AllowXMPPRule and VulNoS2S193.1.193.140AllowXMPPRule . Thereby, giving rise to threats threatNoS2S143.239.75.235 and threatNoS2S193.1.193.140 . In terms of the xmppServ configuration, these vulnerabilities are mitigated by the following countermeasures: xmpprAllow143.239.75.235 and xmpprAllow193.1.193.140 , providing a white-list of trusted XMPP servers for the xmppServ to federate with.
Best practice [37] requires defense in-depth and therefore the firewall countermeasures outlined in Table 1a are further restricted to filter access to the S2S service port to the trusted XMPP servers only. That is, a deny by default policy (iptrDefaultDenyS2SAccess ) is implemented by the gateway firewall (gwFw) where permitted inbound and outbound IP address exceptions are also implemented (Table 1b) Note, provisioning an access control configuration for server federation must also consider additional threats that are not identified in the previous examples, such as Denial of Service or IP address spoofing. However, for reasons of space, additional threats are not discussed. For example, the firewall access-control rules outlined in Example 3 are intended to filter valid XMPP message stanzas to the XMPP server and do not consider the vulnerability of IP header forgery, where the threat of IP spoofing for IP addresses 143.239.75.235 and 193.1.193.140 may be realised. Such a threat coupled with the forging of layer-7 payloads, enable the required deep packet inspection rules implemented by the firewall to be used in an unintended manner. As a consequence, additional threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures must also be considered. It may not always be possible to uphold an enterprise-level security requirement using the current set of access controls. Therefore, additional access controls such as an IPSec VPN [12] may be required. In some cases, the enterprise-level security requirement itself may require further refinement, for example the enforcement of strong authentication using SASL EXTERNAL only.
CATALOGUES OF BEST PRACTICE
Best practice recommendations, for example [30, 34] , encoded as semantic threat graphs require for the most part customised 'tweaking' depending on the network in which they are applied. Therefore, modelling recommendations means that not all assets, threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and their relationships are known in advance. Ontologies are based on Open World Assumption [5] , thereby making it an ideal knowledge framework with which to model both known and unknown facts.
For example, it may not be known in advance what the IP address range of a particular enterprise network is in which the catalogue is being applied to, or if a server is listening on a different port from the IANA [19] recommended default. Therefore, template semantic threat graph individuals are defined as place holders for unknown knowledge. For example, a template XMPP server individual, xmppServ, and associated template iptables individuals iptrAllowInS2SPort that is intended to permit S2S federation access, may have the following known facts: (c) Fine-grained XMPP Access Control using iptables. Table 2 : Corresponding Countermeasure Low-Level Access Control Rules where "−" signifies that the range of a given property is an unknown individual. Deploying the XMPP server within the network, means that it will be assigned an IP address, with the result of the template XMPP server and iptables rule individuals being modified to reflect this new knowledge. Automatic Synthesis of Access-Control Rules. As knowledge about assets, threats and vulnerabilities become known, it becomes possible to consider automatic synthesis of access-control rules. The following SWRL rule dynamically creates a set of iptables firewall rules (using built-in swrlx:makeOWLIndividual ), that will protect XMPP servers from known SPIM threats. Knowledge about an XMPP server's IP address (variable ?xip) and the source IP addresses in which the threat of SPIM (SP IM T hreat(?spim)) has been identified is used to synthesise specific firewall rules (?specific) from a template iptables rule (iptrtemp). 
SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS

Synthesis of Access Control Configuration
Synthesis of an appropriate access control configuration relies on the existence of a knowledge-base of candidate XMPP and firewall access-control rules that are consistent with the enterprise-level security requirements. These could, for example, represent considered best practice for systems that protect XMPP-based applications.
The following is a generic SWRL rule that examines the threats (?threat) and vulnerabilities (?vul) that each enterprise server (?serv) has and searches for suitable countermeasures (?rule) that may be implemented by the appropriate security servers. 
Analysis of Access Control Configuration
The following SQWRL [26] query analyses an existing access control configuration regarding the current security servers (?sec) and their corresponding access-control rules (?rule) that mitigate the threat of a connection-flood Denial of Service attack (threatConnFlood ) against the xmppServ. The query returns a single tuple xmppServ → xmpprLimitConn . As part of defense in-depth, the gwFW, should also implement iptrLimitConn . Thus, further synthesis is required.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A number of existing techniques can be used to generate [7, 13, 14] , query [15, 22, 23] and perform structural analysis [3, 4, 6] on network access control configurations. However, these homogeneous firewall-centric approaches tend not consider their interoperation with other and applicationlayer access controls. This paper extends previous results [9, 10] on ontology-based modeling of iptables and TCPWrapper firewalls by considering how these controls can be managed in conjunction with the application-level controls provided by XMPP. Section 6 demonstrates query-analysis and synthesis of the combined iptables and XMPP configuration ontology. We are currently extending the analysis techniques in [10] to provide structural analysis, such as shadowing, across the combined iptables and XMPP ontology.
A threat-based approach, based on [11] , is proposed in this paper as a strategy for providing a uniform interpretation of the heterogeneous security controls. A knowledge-base of best practice XMPP and firewall countermeasures against known threats are encoded as semantic threat graphs. This knowledge-base is searchable where knowledge about XMPP operational requirements (for example the XMPP port), the enterprise-level security requirements (for example, deny access to untrusted IP addresses) and the threats (for example, SPIM) are used to search for suitable firewall countermeasures. Thus, the approach provides a basis for the automatic generation of access control configurations applicable to specific security mechanisms.
The ontology described in this paper has been populated with approximately fifty threat, vulnerability and countermeasures for XMPP and iptables, derived from existing bestpractices and standards. These include a number of XEP recommendations [2] for XMPP configuration, for example, XEP-0205 (Denial of Service), XEP-0165 (JID Mimicking) and XEP-0159 (SPIM). These are combined with best-practice recommendations for safe firewall configuration, including [20, 33, 34] , demonstrating that the ontology can effectively capture realistic configuration requirements.
APPENDIX A. DL OVERVIEW
Description Logic (DL) is a formalism for representing knowledge (ontology) and belongs to a family of logic that represents a decidable portion of first-order logic [5] . A DLbased ontology is comprised of two components: terminological and assertional knowledge. Terminological knowledge contains intensional knowledge in the form of a terminology, that is, a vocabulary consisting of concepts and property relationships. Concepts represent sets of individuals and properties represent binary relations applied to individuals. Terminological knowledge is constructed through declarations that describe properties of concepts. Assertional knowledge contains extensional knowledge that is specific to individuals (instances of concepts) of the domain of interest.
Description Logic is characterised by a set of constructors (Table 3 ) and axioms ( Table 4 ) that allow for the construction of complex concepts and property relationships (roles) from atomic concepts or properties.
Concepts are interpreted as sets of individuals with common properties. The following DL notation explicitly asserts HTTP Web port (port80) as instance of the P ort concept:
The following naming convention is adopted; concepts and properties are written in italic font, where a concept begins with an uppercase letter and a property begins with a lowercase letter. Individuals are written in a lowercase typewriter font.
Concepts can be organised into a sub-concept hierarchy. For example, concept T CP HeaderF ield represents the fields of a TCP header as defined by [28] . The following DL assertion:
P ort ⊑ T CP HeaderF ield states that: concept P ort is a specialisation (⊑) of concept T CP HeaderF ield, membership of concept P ort implies membership of T CP HeaderF ield, and the membership constraints of concept T CP HeaderF ield are inherited by concept P ort.
A partial concept is specified with necessary conditions (⊑) which state that if an individual is a member of a particular concept, then it must satisfy the conditions that characterise that concept. However, it cannot be said that any (random) individual that satisfies these conditions must be a member of this concept. When a concept is defined with necessary and sufficient conditions (≡), like partial concepts, an individual must satisfy those conditions if it is a member of that concept. However, with the sufficient condition included, then any (random) individual that satisfies these conditions must be a member of this concept. Concepts that have at least one set of necessary and sufficient conditions are known as complete concepts.
A common TCP and UDP header field is the port field [27, 28] . The P ort concept can be defined as having two overlapping parent concepts (intersection) as illustrated by the following DL fragment.
P ort ⊑ T CP HeaderF ield ⊓ U DP HeaderF ield
Enumerated concepts are those that exhaustively enumerate their individuals. In [28] , the TCP protocol defines a set of six flags used to establish the three-way handshake and control ongoing data communication. The following enumerates the F lag concept:
F lag ⊑ {syn, ack, fin, rst, psh, urg} Properties are used to construct binary relationships between individuals and have a domain and range associated with them. For example, an individual of the P ort concept, port80, has a relationship to 80 (an individual of the Integer concept) along the hasP ortV alue property. Properties can also have additional characteristics; inverse, functional, symmetric and transitive. Domain and range constraints are axioms and are used during reasoning. The following defines an excerpt of TCP header and TCP header field property domain and ranges modelled within the ontology. Note, the → symbol denotes a partial function. For example, a T CP Header individual may have a currently unknown P ort individual.
hasP ortV alue : P ort → Integer hasSrcP ort : T CP Header → P ort hasDstP ort : T CP Header → P ort
As with concepts, properties can be hierarchical, where sub-properties specialise their super-properties. For example, the property hasSrcP ort specialises the property hasP ort.
Restrictions can be applied to properties and are used to constrain an individual's membership to a specific concept. A property restriction effectively describes an anonymous or unnamed concept that contains all the individuals that satisfy the restriction. When restrictions are used to describe concepts they specify anonymous super-concepts of the concept being described. Restrictions fall into three categories: Quantifier, hasValue and Cardinality restrictions.
An existential (∃) restriction requires at least one relationship for a given property to an individual that is a member of a specific range concept. A universal (∀) restriction mandates that the only relationships for the given property that can exist must be to individuals that are members of the specified range concept. P ort ⊑ T CP HeaderF ield ⊓ U DP HeaderF ield ⊓ ∃hasP ortV alue.Integer ⊓ ∀hasP ortV alue.Integer
The following DL fragment asserts that individual port22, has a hasP ortV alue property relationship to an individual of the Integer concept and does not have a hasP ortV alue property relationship to an individual that is not a member of the Integer concept. Therefore the assertion representing individual port22, upholds the P ort concept constraints for membership. Informally a DL individual assertion is to be interpreted to mean if the right hand-side of the assertion (←) holds then the left hand-side must also hold.
P ort(port22) ← hasP ortV alue.(port22, 22)
A hasValue restriction, denoted by ∋, describes a set of individuals that are members of an anonymous concept (domain) that are related to a specific individual along the range of a given property. For example, the hasValue restriction hasSrcP ort ∋ port22 describes the anonymous set of individuals that have at least one relationship along the hasSrcP ort property to the specified individual port22. Note, a hasValue restriction is semantically equivalent to an existential restriction along the same property (for example, hasSrcP ort) as the hasValue restriction, which has a range that is an enumerated concept that contains the specific individual used in the hasValue restriction. Cardinality restrictions (=,≤,≥) specify the exact number of relationships that an individual must participate in for a given property. For example, each port number is assigned a single integer value and is asserted by the following cardinality (functional) restriction: ∃=1hasP ortV alue. The following is an extended DL fragment of the P ort concept: P ort ⊑ T CP HeaderF ield ⊓ U DP HeaderF ield ⊓ ∃=1hasP ortV alue.Integer ⊓ ∃=1hasStringV alue.String
Reasoning in DL provides inference of new knowledge from statements asserted within the ontology. This new knowledge is inferred by applying classification, consistency checking and concept satisfiability to the existing ontology [5] . Classification is applied to infer subsumption relationships between concepts from their asserted formal definitions. Ensuring that the ontology does not contain contradictory facts is performed by consistency checking. Concept satisfiability determines if it is possible for a concept to contain individuals. If a concept is unsatisfiable, then creating an individual of that concept causes the entire ontology to become inconsistent. The ability to reason over the ontology is important. A new concept or individual can easily be added to an existing ontology by simply defining its logical characteristics; the reasoner automatically inserts that concept or individual into its correct taxonomy position.
B. A SWRL OVERVIEW
The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL), complements Description Logic by providing the ability to infer additional information from an ontology, but at the expense of decidability. SWRL rules are Horn-clause like rules written in terms of DL concepts, properties and individuals [25] . Informally, a SWRL rule is interpreted to mean that whenever the antecedent holds (i.e., its true), then the conditions in the consequent must also hold. For example, a SWRL rule to express that all ports (variable ?p) are to be inferred as both a TCP header field and a UDP header field can be expressed by the following SWRL assertion.
P ort(?p) → T CP HeaderF ield(?p) ∧ U DP HeaderF ield(?p)
Note, while SWRL can be used to express an individual's hierarchical concept membership, DL should be used to define the subsumption relationship of concepts. In practice, SWRL is used to express that what is not expressible in DL (a SWRL built-in example is shown below).
The SWRL language includes support for user-defined built-ins that are common to most programming and scripting languages [16, 25] . A built-in, is a predicate that takes one or more arguments and evaluates to true if the arguments satisfy the predicate. The following categories of built-ins are supported by SWRL: comparison, mathematical, list operators, strings, temporal, boolean, URI, TBox and ABox [18, 25] . The following SWRL rule: P ort(?p) ∧ hasP ortV alue(?p, ?v)∧ swrlb : lessT hanOrEqual(?v, 1024) → P rivilegedP ort(?p)
states that any port (?p) that has a numerical value less than or equal to 1024 (swrlb : lessT hanOrEqual) is to be classified as a member of the P rivilegedP ort concept. Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language (SQWRL) reuses components of the SWRL language to perform DLbased ontology queries. The SWRL rule antecedent is used as a pattern specification, while the consequent is replaced with a retrieval specification. For example, the most common SQWRL consequent is the sqwrl:select operator, which takes one or more arguments (variables) that correspond to those already specified in the antecedent. Note, all valid SWRL rule antecedent built-ins are valid within SQWRL.
SQWRL queries can operate in conjunction with SWRL rules in an ontology and can be used to retrieve knowledge inferred by those rules. SQWRL queries do not modify the knowledge within the ontology. A SQWRL query that returns all the privileged ports in a given ontology can then be written as:
